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ABSTRACT
Mitigating climate change is often framed as the ultimate collective action problem of
this era and great emphasis is made on the need for approaches that foster
‘cooperation’ and ‘consensus’. This paper argues that the irony of this rhetoric could
not be more stark; climate policy framing is an exclusionary process, and climate
mitigating interventions that are engineered essentially to address neoliberal
economic concerns rather than environmental challenges are often the source of
multiple new conﬂicts. In this regard, this paper shows how the response of local non
governmental organisations (NGOs) to hydropower development in the Darjeeling
region of West Bengal in the Eastern Himalayas bears evidence to Gramscian
analyses of ‘the manufacture of consent’ between elite bourgeois actors – the state,
formal civil society, political parties and the private sector. Such ‘associational’ unions
are only occasionally interrupted, as in the case of the people’s movement, Aﬀected
Citizens of Teesta (ACT) in North Sikkim. Finding a balance between resistance and
enabling political space to think and act diﬀerently, the movement led to the
cancellation of several hydropower projects put forward in the name of climate
mitigation, and in the process, drew attention to political processes involved in the
manufacture of consent. Using case studies from the Darjeeling and Sikkim regions,
this paper distinguishes between Gramsci’s vision of the political space of disruption
vis-à-vis the covert agenda of climate consensus.
Key policy insights
. A politics of consensus in relation to climate change is an outcome of, and in turn
reiterates, a narrowing of distance between the state and civil society.
. Including civil society in climate policy decision making and implementation is
considered positive and inclusive, however, it is important to note that civil society
is not always and everywhere inclusive and transformative.
. Both at global and national levels, it is claimed that climate change interventions
happen in an overall framework of participatory, inclusive environmental
governance; in relation to hydropower development, we note that this is hardly
the practice on the ground.
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Introduction
The culturally and ecologically diverse Eastern Himalayas region, considered climate-vulnerable, is currently also
the target of ambitious hydropower projects. The dramatic comeback of large dams1 producing hydropower as
clean, green and climate-mitigating in global development marks a signiﬁcant reversal in environmental policy
from concerns over the social and environmental impacts of large dams as raised in the World Commission on
Dams report produced in 2000 (Ahlers, Budds, Joshi, Merme, & Zwarteveen, 2015). Several studies have
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researched the social, economic and environmental outcomes of hydropower development through large
dams, including in the locations discussed in this paper (Baruah, 2012; Goldman, 2001; Grumbine & Xu, 2011;
Huber & Joshi, 2015; McDonald, Bosshard, & Brewer, 2009; Newell, 2017). This paper has a diﬀerent focus.
Viewed through the development framework of hydropower as a climate mitigating strategy, our analysis
points to an overtly consensual approach to climate change policies and interventions. Here, environmental
governance has allowed powerful players in the state, market and science community to come together and
construct rhetorical claims of climate problems and solutions (Goldman, 2001; Gough & Shackley, 2001;
Yates, 2012). In this paper, we explore how this practice of a manufacture of consent translates at a local gov-
ernance level, demanding consensus from local elites – government, politicians and civil society. In this hege-
mony of consensual environmental governance, we also analyse how counter-hegemonic alternatives
occasionally erupt and disrupt, re-politicize and re-democratize the consensual politics of climate strategies
in line with Gramsci’s (1971) vision. We do this by comparing and contrasting how local NGOs in the Darjeeling
region of West Bengal, and an indigenous, organically evolved people’s movement, the Aﬀected Citizens of
Teesta (ACT) in North Sikkim responded to state agendas of hydropower development along the Teesta river,
which ﬂows from Sikkim through the Darjeeling region in the Eastern Himalayas and onwards into Bangladesh.
Several researchers have questioned how globally-positioned truths about the environment and natural
resources skillfully permeate climate discourse (Goldman, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2011, 2013). Goldman (2001, p.
194) has detailed how transnational ﬁnancial and developmental institutions including the World Bank and
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have come together in a powerful alliance to construct
the ‘green development science’ in which neocolonial conservationist ideas of enclosure and preservation,
and neoliberal notions of market value and optimal resource allocation, ﬁnd common cause. According to Swyn-
gedouw (2011, p. 4), the positioning of climate change as an ‘apocalyptic crisis’ has helped re-boot capitalist
growth’; and obscure ‘extraordinary socio-spatial heterogeneities and complexities… to ‘a universal singular
… commodity fetishism around CO2’.
Viewed through a climate lens, large dams producing hydropower can indeed be re-positioned as positive,
based on combined principles of sustainability, development and economic growth. But several actors contest
the ‘truth’ of supposedly win-win equations. Firstly, problems associated with large dams, i.e. submergence,
resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced populations, and uneven distribution of costs and beneﬁts,
persist in current hydropower development interventions (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, & Lunn, 2014, p. 4; Rao,
2006, p. 39). As McCully (1996) noted, water is renewable, yet dams are not. It is thus not unsurprising that hydro-
power development in the climate-vulnerable Himalayan regions is rife with controversies over their local
impacts (Dharmadhikary, 2008; Pomeranz, 2009). Secondly, it appears that economic rather than environmental
mandates drive hydropower development in several locations, including in India (Ahlers et al., 2015). Since the
2016 ‘opening up’ of the power sector to private sector participation, the state seems to have obliged the
demands by ﬁnancial actors to unshackle the barriers inhibiting hydropower development.2 Of the 262 dam
(hydropower and irrigation) projects planned during the period between April 2007 to December 2012 in
India, every single one was approved, and only two were sent for reformulation at the initial scoping stage
(SANDRP, 2013). A rare audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in 2016 noted that existing
environmental clearance processes, particularly for hydropower projects, were fraught with serious violations,
noncompliance and deﬁciencies (Singh & Dutta, 2016). Our ﬁeld research ﬁndings, described below, correspond
precisely to such deﬁciencies in the process of mitigating climate change through dam development. However,
our focus is not on the social and environmental impacts of hydropower projects, rather, it is on the politics of
climate consensus that seems to enable such development.
In a study analysing large dams across India, Duﬂo and Pande (2007, p. 1) had pointed out that ‘Overall… large
dam construction in India is a marginally cost-eﬀective investment with signiﬁcant distributional implications, and
has, in aggregate, increased poverty’. Nonetheless, in India’s current liberalized policy setting, hydropower devel-
opment is said to drive economic growth as well as energy security (FICCI-PwC, 2014). Regardless of a rather dismal
environmental performance (see 2016 Comptroller and Auditor General report), the sector is positioned as green-
ing the policy landscape. However, the rhetoric of such claims is evident in the contradictions between climate pol-
icies and strategies on the one hand, and hydropower development on the other. India’s National Action Plan on
Climate Change (NAPCC) speaks of the need to ‘enhance ecological sustainability… ensure stability, particularly of
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the fragile Himalayan Ecosystem’. The term ‘hydropower development’ is conspicuously missing in the NAPCC text.
On the other hand, State Action Plans for Climate Change (SAPCCs) for West Bengal and Sikkim, two Himalayan
states with ongoing hydropower development, mention hydropower development, but largely in the context of
enabling sustainable growth in mountain states. In the SAPCCs for both Sikkim and West Bengal, environmental
concerns are reversed. The focus is not on how large dams might exaceberate climate change impacts, rather it
is on how climate change impacts might threaten the viability and sustainability of hydropower projects.
Analysing the implementation of large dams for hydropower development in Sikkim and West Bengal we
discuss what such developments signal for climate interventions, strategies and policies. Our ﬁndings draw atten-
tion to how the term ‘climate’ is conspicuously absent in the development of hydropower in Sikkim and West
Bengal, even though hydropower development is otherwise at global and national levels positioned explicitly
as a climate changemitigating strategy. We show how local NGOs who chose to contest the skillfully constructed
green economic solution through hydropower development are coerced into silence, noting how resistance or
even critique of such solutions is labelled in India as anti-national and anti-development (Sarma, 2014). Finally, we
note how, in such coercive settings, people’s movements un-shackled to development funds and instruments
seem better able to critique hydropower development than formal, institutionalized NGOs. The distinction we
make in this paper between NGOs and people’s movements is not meant to villify or glorify one above the
other. Rather, our ﬁndings point to the diﬀerent nature of challenges and risks of disagreeing with the state or
a global neoliberal developmental agenda for those who function within and outside the system.
The politics of climate change: consensual environmental governance
Drawing on Urbinati’s writings (2003), Swyngedouw (2009, p. 608) explains how, in the current climate (pun
intended), the very term ‘governance’ is reduced to its bare technicalities –
Governance entails… coordinated activities appropriate to resolve some speciﬁc problems… its recipients are not ‘the
people’ as a collective political subject, but the ‘population’ that can be aﬀected by global issues such as the environment,
migration, or the use of natural resources.
In making prominent imminent, potentially worsening environmental challenges, climate policies have depoli-
ticized the complexity of such challenges through a ‘one quilted… invocation of fear and danger’, which masks
different socio-ecological, – economic and – political contexts, as well as risks and challenges (Swyngedouw,
2011, p. 3).
In such a setting, ‘the question [therefore] is no longer about bringing environmental issues into the domain
of politics… but rather about how to bring the political into the environment’ (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 2). The
latter is the ideological mandate of civil society organisations (CSOs) – working to ensure ‘citizen control of
public life’ (Cox, 1999, p. 27); critically engaging with state hierarchies, to ‘keep the state accountable and
eﬀective’ (Lewis, 2002, p. 571). India is especially acclaimed for its rich history of civil society movements and
for action against environmental wrongs. A vibrant civil society can be traced to the country’s colonial past,
where both individuals and institutions worked to hold the colonial state accountable, challenged its undemo-
cratic processes and eﬀected social and political change (Berglund, 2009; Omvedt, 1994). Post independence,
people’s struggles against the state have been particularly prominent around big dams and displacement.
According to Nayak (2010, p. 71), these pluralistic movements, functioning as ‘coalitions, networks of organiz-
ations and actors’ … often ‘funded and supported by diverse, trans-local interests and mandates’ were key in
‘struggle[s] against the state’s (narrow) agenda of (economic) development through large dams’. In sum,
‘environmental’ concerns have been a common rallying point for a wide array of CSOs: community-based
groups, social welfare organizations, non-proﬁt institutions, social-action groups andmovements, and academic,
activist coalitions (Omvedt, 1993).
Civil society is certainly not a homogenous group, and neither are their actions and activities uniformly
similar. Joy (2014) explains that there are CSOs who act on behalf of the state and those who take confronta-
tional positions against the state and/or other powerful institutions such as the market, society, culture, religion,
etc., to pursue transformational social change. And yet, the very existence and operation of formally organized
CSOs, i.e. NGOs, is deﬁned and dictated by oﬃcial (state) norms in India and elsewhere. Ferguson (1990) speaks
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of how the ‘anti-politics’ of doing development has historically and systematically disabled a political civil society.
In India, all NGOs are (required to be) registered under a colonially-instituted (1860) Societies Registration Act.
This Act, now considered as an Act of Parliament, puts all such registered NGOs under the purview of India’s
Ministry of Home Aﬀairs. Only select NGOs are oﬃcially approved – to receive and use ‘foreign’ development
funds. The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) instituted by the Government of India (GoI) during
the 1975 Emergency rule to regulate NGO functioning, has continued. In the recent past, the state has dealt
ﬁrmly with NGOs with FCRA licences, particularly those who raised concerns on environmental challenges
posed by the implementation of large infrastructure projects (McDuie-Ra, 2008). In December 2016,3 the
Indian Express, a leading national daily, reported that the current national government had cancelled the
FCRA licenses of around 20,000 NGOs, although of course technical reasons were cited as reasons for the ter-
mination of the licences. On another note, Mohan (2002, p. 128) points out how donors and other developmen-
tal funders have engaged local ‘NGOs… (who are) seen as more eﬃcient than corrupt states’ to replace the
government ‘in delivering (basic) services’. The few donors who recognize civil society’s role in monitoring,
and enhancing democracy and transparency in governance, rather than in replacing the state, unfortunately
mostly reach out to reliable, ‘urban-based, professional, elite, advocacy NGOs’, who, ‘concentrate on networking
and encouraging public debate through [exclusionary] seminars and workshops’ (Mohan, 2002, p. 129, 131).
Distinguishing between the ‘politics’ that drives civil society from ‘political’ acts of resistance, Swyngedouw
(2011, p. 376) laments that Jacques Rancière’s ideological visioning of a political civil society, ‘always disruptive
… refus(ing) to observe the “place” allocated to people and things’ is an increasingly ‘imagined’ notion. In his
‘Prison Notebooks’, Gramsci (1971) had argued that alternatives to dominant ideas posed by associational
unions of the bourgeois can and must emerge from ordinary citizens, from those who function outside the ‘poli-
tico-jurisdiction’ of hegemonic civil society. We have found this framework – of CSOs operating inside and
outside the politico-jurisdiction of state authority and outreach – particularly useful in analysing local CSO
response to consensual climate change intervention strategies in the Eastern Himalaya region.
Research methodology and context
The ﬁndings presented in this paper reﬂect over three years’ interaction with multiple NGOs and activists in the
Darjeeling and Sikkim regions of the Eastern Himalaya, and draw on conversations in numerous meetings, work-
shops, formal and informal discussions. Additionally, the paper draws on two students’ M.A. thesis research in
2015, which independently analyzed NGOs in the Darjeeling region, and the Lepcha anti-dam movement,
Aﬀected Citizens of Teesta.
In doing this research, we often reﬂected on the complicity and positionality of academics and researchers
working on climate issues. It is in this light that we note Mohan’s (2002, p. 129) concern that ‘NGOs… are under
increasing criticism and scrutiny from academics and policy practitioners’. We also acknowledge a research pro-
ject’s limitations to unravel complex socio-political histories in a particular time frame, and we are also aware of
how ‘outsider’ research-focused perspectives sit uncomfortably with complex local realities – the challenges,
coercions and compulsions, spatial heterogeneities, social networks, local calamities, etc. that impact what
NGOs and activists do (or can’t) locally. Our ﬁndings thus try and portray, analyze, and interpret each situation’s
uniqueness, complexity and situatedness, giving a ‘sense of being there’ (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p.
129) with the intention to tease out learning for climate action and interventions.
The Darjeeling district of West Bengal is in North-Eastern India, South of the state of Sikkim (see Maps 1 and
2). The projects discussed in this paper involve two recent hydropower developments, the Teesta Low Dam Pro-
jects III & IV (see Map 2), which were commissioned in 2016. From June to August 2015, we interviewed 30 NGOs
in the Darjeeling region through qualitative methods. Our focus was to understand how and why these NGOs
were established, how they operate and on what issues, eventually focusing the discussions on their engage-
ment with the Teesta Low Dam projects. In addition, because the Darjeeling region has been embroiled for
over four decades in a political struggle for a separate state, Gorkhaland, we tried to unpack the institutional
structure and culture in which NGOs operate, the challenges and risks faced by staﬀ members in their day-
to-day work and how this impacts what they choose to do (or not). The interviews with NGO staﬀ members
and/or organization head were thus deliberately semi-structured.
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Our research in Sikkim focused on dam development in the Dzongu region, which lies in North Sikkim. The
Dzongu region has particular cultural and ethno-political signiﬁcance for the Lepcha people. Once the key
inhabitants of the Eastern Himalayas, the Lepchas are now considered a ‘Vanishing Tribe’ (Foning, 1987) – a min-
ority, demographically, culturally as well as politically. The political history of the Lepchas is complex. For the
purposes of this paper, however, the key point to note is that, following Sikkim’s annexation to India in 1975,
the last monarch of Sikkim declared Dzongu as a Lepcha reserve (see Map 3), restricting access to the
region, including for non-Lepcha Sikkimese citizens. This ecological and cultural preservation of Dzongu was
also announced as constitutionally non-negotiable. This makes Dzongu in North Sikkim what is commonly
referred to as the ‘last bastion’ of the Lepchas, a place where they are not a minority and where, supposedly,
their culture, language and identity can survive uncompromised. This explains why the plan to develop
seven large hydropower dams in Dzongu, ﬁve inside Dzongu and two along its borders was extremely conten-
tious, and gave rise to the formation of the ACT. Unlike other contestations against large dams, the ACT struggle
was not driven by material concerns about relocation, rehabilitation and/or compensation. It was relational
aspects of space and place that led the Lepchas to declare that, ‘there can be no dams (along the Teesta
River) in Dzongu’.
We used both qualitative and quantitative methods in analyzing the ACT movement. The respondents here
were, except for two interviewees, all Lepchas. In all, 24 focused interviews were conducted with Lepchas living
in Dzongu, in the state capital of Gangtok in Sikkim, and in Darjeeling and Kalimpong towns in West Bengal. The
Map 1. Darjeeling region of West Bengal.
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youngest interviewee was 19, and the oldest 80. As with the NGOs in Darjeeling, the qualitative interviews were
semi-structured. In addition, 53 quantitative surveys asked open- and closed-ended questions of participants
who were not interviewed in detail (through qualitative methods). In both studies, communication in English
was largely possible with the respondents (NGO staﬀ and Lepcha individuals). A translator was needed in
only a couple of cases (Lepcha interviewees, ACT Study).
The rise and fall of NGO resistance against hydropower projects in Darjeeling
In 2015, only one NGO among the 30 interviewed said they were (still) contesting hydropower projects. All other
NGOs stated that they no longer resisted hydropower projects, though all claimed to have actively opposed
dams (Teesta Lower Dam Projects (TLDP) III and IV) in the past. This shift intrigued us. What had happened
and why did these NGOs insist on their silence regarding dams? Understanding this requires understanding
how and why these NGOs were established, how they are currently funded, regulated and thus operate.
Against this background, we discuss the engagement of local NGOs on environmental/climate issues and
how this translated to the context of hydropower development.
NGOs doing development
It is important to illustrate the political fragility in the Darjeeling region and how this impacts what local com-
munities and NGOs do (or not) in relation to environmental challenges. Administratively, the region of Darjeeling
Map 2. Hydropower projects in the Darjeeling region.
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is governed as the Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA) under the state of West Bengal. However, as recently
as September 2017, the GTA closed down completely for 104 days, during which time there was a violent
conﬂict for political separation from the state of West Bengal. The entire region was physically cordoned oﬀ
by state security forces and the state Government blocked internet usage. This was yet another attempt in
the now four-decade long struggle to secure a separate state of Gorkhaland.
This precarity explains why local communities living along the major road connecting Gangtok, Sikkim’s
capital city, to Siliguri in West Bengal have been relatively silent about the two large dam projects, TLDP III
and IV, operating in their backyard. Despite living here for over 70 years (Field research, 2015) these commu-
nities still lack legal rights to land as well as formal basic services. Kalijhora settlement, just above the Teesta
Low Dam IV project (TLDP IV), has around 110 households. It was only in 1980 that the settlement was ﬁrst
included under a formal administration, Champasari Gram Panchayat (the three-tiered local government) in Sili-
guri, some 25 kilometres away. More recently, Kalijhora has been annexed to Sitong Gram Panchayat –which is a
Map 3. Locating Dzongu.
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steep uphill ascent, some 10 kilometres away. Kalijhora residents have little in common with the more settled,
landed farming community of Sitong. ‘Such arbitrary inclusions shows that we are “this nowhere people”’ (Field
research, 2015). In fact, the permanent oﬃce of the National Hydropower Corporation (NHPC) project which runs
TLDP III and IV projects is now Kalijhora’s most prominent landmark. This is dramatically diﬀerent to the
grounded place-based identity that the Lepchas experience in Dzongu. The ways in which Dzongu Lepchas
can articulate belonging to, ownership and control of the region’s land, rivers and forests is unthinkable for Kalij-
hora residents.
Such complexities in the Darjeeling region create a mineﬁeld of socio- political and economic challenges
around environmental governance, which are areas where civil society could intervene. But no NGO in the Dar-
jeeling region queries political-environmental coercions. Most NGOs in Darjeeling receive project-speciﬁc funds
from the Central Government for activities such as organic farming, environmental awareness campaigns, forest
ﬂoriculture activities, sanitation, etc. (Field research, 2015). The few with oﬃcial approval to receive foreign
funding do similar development work for donors such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
for safe drinking water; the US Agency for International Development (USAID) for community forestry work;
and the European Commission for smallholder innovation for climate-change resilient food security, etc.
NGOs here consider themselves immensely fortunate to have an FCRA-holding status and are thus careful
not to lose it.
Luckily, as an organization we joined (sic) the FCRA in 1996; we had a couple of good people who supported us; we had our
papers [in order]: society’s registration, income tax registration forms, etc. We are one of the few lucky ones who have the
registration and we’ve been careful to ensure continued approval of our FCRA. It’s not easy, but we have our papers up to
date and we’ve kept it clean and clear. We have continued our registration since the early 2000s, so almost ﬁfteen years.
When we asked further on the aspect of luck in having an FCRA, we were told,
I think it’s got tighter and tighter… newer rules. There has been a lot of control. And because we are a border state with Nepal, the
Maoist movement there, the Gorkhaland movement here…more and more FCRAs are restricted here. So, we were lucky to get it’.
As noted elsewhere, project-driven development prevents ‘facilitating transformative development’ and
demands accountability primarily to donors and other regulatory authorities (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015,
p. 708). This also tends to make NGOs competitive and territorial, and evade issues of wider, political
concern. With limited ﬁnancial support, most NGOs struggle to survive and can rarely hope to address
broader, political and/or environmental injustices: ‘There are many problems, but you need money to ﬁght. We
could ﬁle a case in the court, but for that you need to pay a lawyer. Without lawyers, we couldn’t ﬁle a case’
(Field research, 2015).
Ours is an organization that came up without too much ﬁnancial support. We rely largely on funding from the Government.
Somewhere around 1998 or 1999, it started dawning on us that this was not going anywhere because this is too small; we are
not even able to create local inﬂuence, we have no power, really. We don’t have any fund, we don’t have any resources. Our
actions are being guided by the ground rules set by the Government oﬃcials. We are evading the real issues, really. (Field
research, 2015)
Thus, most NGOs in Darjeeling work on environmental issues deﬁned by donor-driven agendas of deforestation,
landslides, water-supply scarcity and biodiversity conservation. Here, solutions are often predetermined to match
apolitical framings of socio-environmental problems (Yates, 2012). A few NGO workers spoke of politics and power
in environmental governance, but these views are also mostly circumscribed to popular political agendas of Gor-
khaland: ‘What is needed is to completely remove the West Bengal government [the forest corporation] which is inter-
ested only in proﬁting from our forests’ (Field research, 2015). However, such views are expressed with an immediate
request for anonymity. After all, it is explained – ‘politics is the work of politicians’ (Field research, 2015). NGOs here,
as we are told, do development, i.e. implement conservation, aﬀorestation programmes and projects.
The logic of apolitical development
Being apolitical requires careful eﬀort by NGOs to avoid using their work and data to challenge contentious
issues. A local NGO shared data which points to evidence that hydropower development in this fragile
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ecology accelerates landslides. They are fully aware of the visible negative impacts of large-scale hydropower
development in the region but are constrained from using this evidence to contest large dams. According to
them, their role is to ‘inform citizens and authorities about precautionary measures that can reduce human
impact on landslides’ (Field research, 2015). This hesitation is both logical and skewed. Most local NGOs
mostly rely on oﬃcial ﬂows of funding and are fully aware of the fact that FCRA-holding NGOs in North-East
India and elsewhere have been regularly ‘blacklisted’ by government authorities. Often the reasons for this
are related to raising environmental concerns that are considered politically incorrect, but of course, various
other reasons are cited for ‘correcting’ the work of NGOs (Bhaumik 2003 in McDuie-Ra, 2008, p. 195). Dissent
from mainstream development agendas is considered a sign of social dangerousness (Foucault, 1979) and is
quickly contained at several levels. One NGO, which had actively protested against the two projects (TLDP
III&IV), was summoned by the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs:
Out of the blue, we were asked to come to Delhi with all our accounts and invoices dating back to when we started work and
got registered as an NGO. Thankfully, we had stored all our paperwork. We took boxes of paperwork all the way to Delhi, there
were so many boxes that it ﬁlled up an entire hotel room. Our meeting at the Home Oﬃce was chilling. Little was said, no
explanations were given – it seemed we were being told indirectly to lie low. (Field research, 2015)
In our discussions, it was obvious that the question to ask was not why the silence, but rather, why any contesta-
tions? Why had some local NGOs chosen to protest against the TLDP III & IV projects in the early planning stages?
Many of the NGO staﬀ members we spoke to said that the environmental impacts of the hydropower projects
were blatantly visible: river-ecology changes, increased frequency and magnitude of landslides, unpredictable
shifts in groundwater availability around dam locations from excavations, tunnelling etc. As actors working on
environmental issues, it was diﬃcult for them to keep silent. These aspects of distributional environmental injus-
tices – high risks, losses and challenges to local communities – made for a stark complement to aspects of pro-
cedural injustices in environmental governance. Oﬃcial regulation as outlined in the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) requires inclusive, consultative decision-making processes. On the ground, NGOs noticed
‘the lack of transparency, lack of people’s participation in any form of decision-making in relation to dam develop-
ment’ (Field research, 2015). The repondents revealed how EIA documents were not made public or only EIA
summaries (and not in the local language) were available at locations distant from project-aﬀected regions.
The NGOs observed consensual arrangements between hydropower developers, state and central government
authorities and university faculty undertaking the EIA studies. They also noted how compensation was arbitrarily
set for project-aﬀected communities and/or promises made to local communities, so that they approved the
projects. ‘They told farmers in one village that a watershed project would be implemented, this was never followed
through’ (Field research, 2015). In another village (Suruk), ‘(developers) promised a bridge, a school, electricity con-
nections – nothing was provided’ (Field research, 2015). The new agenda of Corporate Social Responsibility
requires hydropower companies to invest a share of their investments in socially-relevant initiatives. This was
(mis)used to manufacture consent, ‘to privilege local elite (politicians, contractors) with contracts to construct
roads, bridges, community centres, what have you’ and build on the patronage of the elite to enable companies
to implement their projects ‘smoothly’ without any objections from local communities (Field research, 2015).
Huge sums of money exchanged hands, enabling some of the local elite to become new political actors of
prominence.
We fought the Rammam hydro-project and stopped [power] generation for almost two months by blocking the intake area.
Eventually, the project manager came to our oﬃce and agreed to provide eight lakhs [800,000 rupees] per household… So, we
allowed them (the project-aﬀected) to earn that. They also gave us an additional three crores [thirty million rupees] for sur-
rounding developments; playgrounds, tourist development. (Field research, 2015)
In the contentious, fragile political space, this was an opportunity for aspiring local politicians to ‘appropriate’
resources. It was another matter that for marginalized residents of settlements such as Kalijhora, the gains
through employment and compensation – no matter how short-term or skewed – presented an opportunity
unlike anything they had experienced before. Our ﬁndings point to uneven terrains of citizenship and govern-
ance. It is only rarely and often too late (as in this case) that ofﬁcial reports (2016 CAG Audit report) conﬁrm the
inappropriateness of the regulatory processes applied in the case of environmental policies and strategies.
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The politics of dissent
During the peak of dam building activities on the TLDP III&V, several civil-society groups from Delhi and else-
where, who had more experience on environmental and social injustices and also more political standing, sup-
ported local NGOs in their critique and contestation of large dams. This was when there was ﬁnally some
coverage of these issues in national newspapers (The Economic Times; Indian Express). And yet, this networking,
while immensely relevant, yielded a serious backlash for the local NGOs. Local NGOs realized they were far more
vulnerable to local political coercion than civil-society actors from outside the area. Local NGOs were trapped in
a setting where ‘the [political] leaders were selectively coercing local communities and/or NGOs to either protest
against the project or enable developers to go ahead with the construction’ as a tactic of having nuisance value
(Field research, 2015). Although no one would validate this, everyone we met spoke of the large sums of
money that exchanged hands through these processes – till the developers obtained the ‘No Objection Certiﬁ-
cate/s (NOC)’ needed for the EIA approval. More established politicians in Darjeeling also played into these
games: Sometimes they would ‘raise public opinion against the dams, participate in public hearings and ask
pointed questions pending approval’ and at other times, declare, ‘we have no rights to stop the project when
the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal have already signed an agreement with the developer’
(Field research, 2015). Whenever it suited them, local politicians controlled the action of the NGOs.
For the TLDP III project, we had thoroughly prepared for questioning the developer, the National Hydroelectric Power Corpor-
ation (NHPC) at the public hearing. When the time for the hearing came, we were threatened by the local politicians to not
attend the hearings at all. We were told that if were seen there, they (aﬃliates of political parties) would break our legs. (Field
research, 2015)
A frightened NGO staff member mentioned with a request for anonymity, ‘They wanted to kill me if I did not stop
… because when you talk about dams there is lots of money involved… the companies give a lot of money to a lot
of local politicians’ (Field research, 2015). We cannot substantiate this claim, except to say that this view was
repeated by many others, including those in formal, public ofﬁces. This form of coercion is not surprising –
violent coercive street-politics is in fact the dominant style of local governance (see Joshi, 2015).
In sum, various coercions eventually dissuaded local NGOs from challenging the decision to implement the
dam projects, even though most explain, ‘In your mind you know it’s not good, it’s all wrong. But feeling that is one
thing and openly saying that, taking a principl[ed], political stand, throws you into the political area. Many of us
cannot do the latter’ (Field research, 2015). Our ﬁndings contextualize what was reported in the 2016 CAG
Audit report, including ﬂawed EIA processes and ﬂawed environmental governance. Additionally, our
ﬁndings conﬁrm that while water is renewable, dams are not. The fact that it has been possible to roll out
large dams as climate mitigating interventions in fragile ecosystems speaks of explicit compliance at scale.
Asking for whom and how hydropower development is beneﬁcial is not tolerated well, but such questions
are also rarely asked especially in fragile democracies. And yet, as we discuss below, despite the fear of
dissent, the business of compliance does occasionally get ruptured.
Dissent: the case of the Aﬀected Citizens of Teesta
As mentioned above, it was relational, rather than material concerns that led to the ACT movement against
dams in Dzongu. The Lepchas were not negotiating compensation, relocation or resolving anomalies in the
EIA process for the dam projects. Rather they questioned the ecological, cultural and social impacts of the pro-
posed seven large dams planned inside (5) and around (2) Dzongu.
Foning (1987), a Lepcha scholar from Kalimpong district in West Bengal, voices fears that resonate widely in
the Lepcha community – that geo-political, social and economic upheavals in the region have decimated the
Lepchas, and inter- and intra-national administrative boundaries have displaced and uprooted them, their
culture and their way of life. Little (2010) notes that there are approximately 45,000 Lepchas in Sikkim and
some 70,000 outside the state (Government of Sikkim 2006). Aside from the 7000 Lepchas living in Dzongu,
all others, including Lepchas from outside Dzongu and other Sikkimese nationals, require an oﬃcial permit
to enter Dzongu. ‘Dzongu is [the last bastion of] our Mayel Lyang (hidden paradise); if it is desecrated then
our culture becomes extinct!’ (ACT ideologue, Athup Lepcha, reported in Arora, 2006).
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In our research, Lepcha members and supporters of the movement often expressed that they found it hypo-
critical to say no to dams and still use/rely on electricity. Their argument was that Dzongu, as a protected Lepcha
reserve, was ill-suited to such large-scale development. Some even added that perhaps large hydropower pro-
jects were more suited to ‘other areas, where… the carrying capacity is better – than [here] …– an environmen-
tally fragile and demographically endangered place’ (Field research, 2015). While the average ACT supporter was
relatively indiﬀerent to hydropower development in areas not aﬀecting Dzongu, a resounding 88.3% of the
same respondents were against it in Dzongu; 47.7% ‘strongly opposed’ dams in Dzongu (Field research, 2015).
We (Lepchas) have been here for centuries, following our culture, tradition, language. And today, in the name of development,
they are ﬁnishing it. Is this development? When you lose your identity, you are gone. Finished! So… in that sense, I think
Lepchas, especially in Dzongu… I think it is a sort of a design to ﬁnish us. (Mayel Lyang Development Board Chairperson,
in Interview, Kalimpong, 2015)
The opposition to dams led initially by a handful of Lepcha youth from Dzongu is popularly positioned as a his-
toric reassertion of space by a ‘vanishing’ tribe, whose identity is intertwined with the spatial relevance of
Dzongu to their culture. And yet, ACT’s success in cancelling four of the seven dams through a largely non-
violent Gandhian pathway (Arora, 2006) described as ‘a David and Goliath battle’ (Little, 2010) goes beyond
the environmental struggles of a displaced minority and powerful development actors. Gergan (2014, p. 70,
72) notes that, before hydropower projects planned in Dzongu propelled the reserve ‘into the center of contro-
versy’, Dzongu was, for all practical purposes, ‘a landscape of precarity… [where] remoteness, isolation and poor
infrastructure profoundly shaped everyday experiences’. The ACT struggle was deeply political; it was essentially
a resistance to the coercion in the manufacture of consent by powerful outside actors, which was supported by
the Lepcha elites in Dzongu. This practice of political patronage is essentially how government and governance
operates in the State of Sikkim (Huber & Joshi, 2015). McDuie-Ra’s (2011, p. 89) analysis of pro-dam actors is one
of the rare accounts of how many Lepchas in Dzongu were pro-dam and against the ACT, even ‘pressur[ing] the
state to accelerate the projects’. The struggle of the protesting youth was against both internal as well as exter-
nal actors and pressures. In the sections below, we describe how climate strategies shaped by principles of com-
modiﬁcation, in this case, supposed material gains from clean energy and the offsetting of CO2 (somewhere far
away), are ill-equipped to recognize relational values and meanings of local places.
ACT: an unprecedented political movement
It is important to note that the current elected government in Sikkim has managed to remain in power since
1994. This has been possible by skillfully establishing patron-client dependence among an ethnically divided
constituency (Huber & Joshi, 2015). Any prominent critique of the government and governance was unheard
of in Sikkim until the ACT movement. Nonetheless, while the NGOs in Darjeeling spoke of coercions and corrup-
tion, they were unable to publicly ‘shame’ their local politicians. On the other hand, the ACT founder members
skillfully drew attention to ‘the state’s double standards’: bestowing protected status on Dzongu as an ecologi-
cal, minority-resident reserve, and then violating its own assertion by ‘plans to take away the very land and indi-
genous culture of the people it claims to be protecting’ (Dawa Lepcha, reported in Arora, 2006). This ‘rejecting of
the way things are… ’ was unprecedented in Sikkim (Li, 2007). This ‘practice of politics’ had far-reaching reper-
cussions – both for the ACT members, but also for the state. These deliberately political acts unmasked the
otherwise carefully nurtured, rhetorical image of Sikkim as a model of Indian democracy.
ACT members consistently spoke and acted from a place of dissent. During the ﬁrst public hearing event in
the EIA approval process for the Teesta Stage III project in Chungthang, which borders Dzongu, ACT members
noted that 80% of the audience were ‘pro-dam’ state administrative oﬃcials, politicians, dam developers and
local elites. This disproportionate representation at an event meant to enable local community to participatorily
review and decide on whether the project should be approved was immediately critiqued by ACT members as
‘engineered to intimidate dissent’ (Wangchuk, 2007, p. 35). When the technical proposal for this particular dam
was declared as having cleared the EIA, ACT activists did not accept defeat. They pooled personal resources to
ﬁle a legal case ‘in the National Environmental Appellate Authority in New Delhi against the public hearing and
the verdict’ (ibid). When this failed as well, ACT activists physically blocked roads into Chungthang, preventing
district oﬃcials and dam developers from surveying land needed for another hydropower project, Panan,
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located in Dzongu. These inspections eventually happened – with police escort for the oﬃcials and developers
and detention restrictions announced for the activists. And yet, the ACT members did not themselves impose
their views among other Lepchas in Dzongu. 74 of the 99 Lepcha households in Dzongu, whose lands were to be
acquired for the Panang hydropower project, welcomed the project. Wangchuk (2007) notes how, during the
peak of ACT protests in 2007, some 90 Panan families handed over a memorandum clarifying that they were
not part of the ACT protest and emphasising that they would welcome the project in return for better compen-
sation rates and other technical safeguards. Nonetheless, the small handful of the protesting Lepcha youth from
Dzongu were able to garner support from a much larger group of Lepchas outside Sikkim, and their protests
eventually led to the canceling of the Panan project. Multiple tactics of coercion promising development
beneﬁts to supporters and to activists who withdrew their support, and the punishing of those who refused
to yield, failed to entice the small number of ACT founder members (Wangchuk, 2007).
The ACT movement centred around dam building in Dzongu eventually moved the site of protests from
Dzongu to the state capital, Gangtok. Here peaceful collective protests and marathon rounds of fasting totalling
915 days (between 2007–2010) helped draw national and international attention to the politics of hydropower
development in Sikkim (Huber & Joshi, 2015). Protests were also staged in India’s capital, New Delhi. Eventually,
four of the ﬁve dams planned inside Dzongu were cancelled but, much more importantly, the movement
exposed the structure and culture of coercive governance and the mere rhetoric of democracy in Sikkim. The
exercise of people power tremendously inspired a new wave of citizen voice and choice. As a Lepcha ACT sup-
porter from Darjeeling noted, ‘Government will never make [people aware]. NGOs will not do that. It is the Lepchas
themselves who have to do this. We did it’ (Field research, 2015).
Gergan (2014, p. 67) has argued ‘that the anti-dam protests became a way for the Dzongu youth to question
[not just] state development agendas [but equally Lepcha] elders and urban elite’ who had long claimed to
speak on behalf of the community. This dissent fractured families, in a cultural context where respect for
elders demands complete subservience. It was thus against extraordinary odds that a few Lepcha youth
acted upon the ‘experience of everyday hardships’ in Dzongu to expose ‘the community’s skewed dependence
on Government and exclusionary practices’ of governance through coercion (ibid, p. 68). As Gregan (ibid) notes,
these young people became ‘alchemists of the revolution’, by defending their fragile homeland against the
incursion of ‘climate friendly’ hydropower amid coercion, collusion, and obfuscation by political leaders and
developers. The ACT movement was a complex struggle inter-weaving the personal and political, rhetoric
and reality of indigeneity, and varying perceptions and experiences of place, identity and citizenship that
exposed the rhetoric of development agendas, increasingly implemented as ill-conceived climate strategies.
Conclusion
The politics of consensus, or rather the process of manufacturing consent for climate strategies, runs deep and
wide. What we researched and discussed in Darjeeling and Sikkim mirrors the nature and circumstances in
which hydropower projects are being rolled out in fragile democracies in the region: in India’s North-East
and in the neighbouring Mekong Basin. In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the rush to implement hydro-
power participatorily happens where historically there has been no culture of participation (Goldman, 2001;
Grumbine & Xu, 2011; Matthews & Motta, 2015), and where civil society is either absent, heavily restricted
and/or criminalized (Matthews & Schmidt, 2014). Our ﬁndings draw attention to what is likely ongoing as a
rhetoric of cooperation, consensus, citizen participation and engagement in processes of building large dams
as climate mitigating strategies in these and other areas. As our ﬁndings show, the consensual politics of
climate change ‘shrouded (globally) in (a) complex rhetoric’ of terms such as ‘emission trading’ (Gough & Shack-
ley, 2001, p. 330) are grossly unrepresentative of unique ground realities and other values and meanings of
place, space and nature.
It is not unsurprising that, although government and governance systems and processes, as well as the local
communities experiencing dam development, in the Darjeeling and Sikkim regions were vastly diﬀerent, the
intrusions of power and politics in diverse places, institutions and actors were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The
power of the state resides not only in a ‘centre’ terminal point, but rather is diﬀused and networked through
a range of ‘technologies’ (Foucault, 1979). And in the case of hydropower development, this power is welded
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from the very apex of climate planning to areas where climate strategies are implemented – with powerful
ﬁnancial interests geared to commodify fundamental elements of life (Harvey, 2006).
Our ﬁndings show that counter hegemonic possibilities for political action, andmore nuanced, alternative revi-
sionings of human-nature links, require civil society to carefully distance themselves from ‘epistemic climate coal-
tions’ (Gough & Shackley, 2001). Unfortunately, this is hardly possible for formal NGOs, especially those engaged
in doing development, because political power operates rationally through rather than for civil society, making
NGOs both the object and subject of the bourgeoisies and the elite (Bryant, 2002; Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde,
2006; Rose & Miller, 1992; Sending & Neumann, 2006). NGOs in the Darjeeling region (as elsewhere) – entangled
in the ‘service delivery paradigm’; bound by ‘ﬁnancial logic and challenging local circumstances’; and under scru-
tiny, discipline, control and surveillance of the state – can do little else but collaborate in this web of consensual
governance (Rahman, 2006, pp. 451–453). The positioning and promotion of large dams as environmental as well
as economic solutions did provoke some local NGOs in Darjeeling to ‘return to politics’ (Banks et al., 2015, p. 715),
but these initiatives were short-lived, partly because of the context in which these NGOs exist and operate. In the
Darjeeling region, the absence of a functional ‘political’ democracy impacts the lack of civil society, and this
vicious cycle persists. And like in Darjeeling, but diﬀerently in Sikkim, civil freedoms have long been missing
(Joshi, 2015), although precisely for that reason they should re-emerge. Nonetheless till then, hydropower devel-
opment or any other form of translocal coercion, requires no more than a façade of participation.
In such a skewed terrain, the ACT movement was born out of a diﬀerent visioning – one where identity and
citizenship was not disassociated from place and space, where Lepchas, Dzongu and the Teesta were inter-
twined socially and culturally. Thus, the language of the resistance was rooted in expressions and meanings
of feelings and emotions (Hudson, 2009). The movement was successful not only because it existed and oper-
ated outside established systems and structures, but also because the actors did not speak in the material
language of dams and development – the language promoted by the state and spoken by the NGOs as well.
This was a strategic diﬀerence: the state had no tools or methods to respond to the relational aspects of resist-
ance. Here, Gramsci’s ideas of creating and claiming a space for political agency was possible. This required
crossing multiple conventional boundaries of community and society, re-politicizing themselves, their personal
relations, surroundings and the wider political context. In that context, dams became the medium/means, rather
than the object/end, of this desire for transformation (Vispute and Joshi, forthcoming).
Our ﬁndings draw attention to the conscious naievity through which unequal partnerships between the
state, markets, civil society and diversely unequal local communities are promoted in the climate discourse.
We question this ‘rhetoric of partnerships’ (Mohan, 2007) and ask where the line is drawn between consensusual
environmental governance and the manufacture of climate consensus. We could conclude by stating that a
greater solidarity between diverse civil society actors and institutions could perhaps better challenge the con-
sensual politics of eco-governmentality. But this would suggest ‘associational unions’ (Gramsci) and cast a
shadow on the logic of countering hegemony. In any case, this recommendation is easier said than done.
What remains of a dammed Teesta river ﬂows far beyond the divided administrative borders of the states of
Sikkim and West Bengal – well into Bangladesh. Even between the closely nestled Sikkim and Darjeeling
regions, ethnic-fractures and local politics divide, rather than unite, local communities and the civil society.
Nonetheless, governance is on the ‘move’ and relationships between the state and civil society are neither
static nor predictable. It is in this ﬂuidity and uncertainty that we anticipate that citizens in diverse settings
will, in diverse ways, continue to reshape the politics of climate consensus despite challenging odds.
Notes
1. The IFC Guide to Dams for Developers and Investors (2015, p. 18) speciﬁes the following typology by scale of production:
Micro P < 0.1 MW
1. Small 0.1 MW< P < 10 MW (some countries go up to 30–35 MW)
2. Medium 10 MW< P < 100 MW
3. Large P > 100 MW.
2. https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/energy-speak/hydropower-project-development-in-india-issues-and-way-
forward/1713
3. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/since-2014-20000-ngos-lost-fcra-licence-4447820/
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